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	Indicative	Subjunctive
Imperfect	1	73
Perfect	3	0
Pluperfect	4	53

Without stopping to look up these cases, most readers will feel the absurdity of assuming that in four books of Caesar there is but one case of purely temporal *cum* with the imperfect tense, and four with the pluperfect, especially as, in this small total, provision must be made for cases of repeated action.

The situation then may be graphically represented as follows:

	'Since' Cause	'Though' Concession	'When' Circumstance	Time
1				→
2			→	
3			→	

In this diagram the first line indicates roughly the point to which the subjunctive actually penetrated into *cum*-clauses of the past in the usage of a writer like Caesar. The second line shows where the theory of the Grammar stops. And the third indicates the usage of the majority of students, who find the Grammar rule a puzzling and perverse guide.

It may not be flattering to face the fact; but it is true, nevertheless, that the old-fashioned rule '*cum*-temporal introduces the subjunctive in the imperfect and pluperfect tenses, the indicative elsewhere' is for nearly all students a far better guide to the usage of Caesar and Cicero than is the new doctrine. Indeed, if the old rule is supplemented by the statement that 'Repeated action calls for the indicative', and the English sentences for translation into Latin are framed with any care, this rule of thumb will be found to work exceedingly well; for at this stage of the work the class in writing need not be troubled by the introduction of the rare and the incidental.

As noted at the beginning of this paper, the makers of Composition books usually help us little at points where the Grammar fails. Moreover, it is far from the ideal to have one rule for reading and another for writing. A heavy responsibility therefore is put upon the makers and revisers of School Grammars to fashion statements that will be a safe guide both for those who read and for those who write.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Roman Imperialism. By Tenney Frank. New York: The Macmillan Company (1914). Pp. 365. \$2.50.

Mr. Frank registers a vigorous protest against those historians who must needs apply the subtleties of twentieth century diplomacy to the proceedings of the

bourgeois Senate of ancient Rome and who are afraid that they may be regarded as simpletons if they interpret the simple negotiations of a primitive people in a simple way. It is true that scientific historians have done much in purging the ancient sources of their anachronisms, but they have been only too willing to accept the words of Vergil as the actual inspiration of Rome's foreign policy from Aeneas to Augustus. The modern factors which develop the imperialistic idea in nations, such as innate desire of possession, commercialism, necessity of expansion to provide for surplus population, etc., can not be applied with justice to the early Romans, who were an agricultural people, not thickly settled, possessed of no factories, trade or commerce, a people who in voting for war had not only to tax themselves directly to defray the expenses of the campaign, but must leave the plow to take up the sword. In a period covering many centuries and the changing conditions of the Roman Republic no single formula can be consistently applied.

Under the Republic the governing body at Rome was the Senate, a body powerfully influenced by ancestral tradition, extremely jealous of its authority, and thoroughly permeated with the religious restrictions of the *ius fetiale*, which forbade wars of aggression. As long as the Senate controlled the policies of the state, Rome declared war only when compelled to fight by the aggressiveness of her neighbors. The territory of the enemy was annexed only if it proved necessary to do so in the interests of law and order. Mr. Frank, taking as his text the *ius fetiale*, analyzes the various steps in the expansion of Rome, briefly but clearly setting forth the motives of the dominant parties in the political life of the state and summarizing the local conditions from which the imperialistic idea grew and flourished in democratic surroundings.

The fertile plain of Latium was surrounded by nations not so richly endowed and bound by no conscientious scruples in regard to offensive warfare. By virtue of constant pressure from without Rome developed a power of endurance and an organizing faculty which eventually, when the time for aggressive action came, proved irresistible. When the encroachments of the Volscians were checked, Rome took the offensive, and, after peace was made, she guarded against future attacks by planting Latin colonies in the conquered territory. This policy ultimately proved to be most successful and played an important part in later imperialism. At first, however, expansion was too rapid and the home federation was so severely weakened that it could not withstand the Aequi. The invasion of the Gauls, though utterly draining the resources of the state, proved to be the turning point in Rome's fortunes. Her position on the Tiber, which protected her from the Etruscans, her harbor, and the fact that this was a natural distributing center led to an extraordinary development which speedily gave her the preëminence in the Latin confederacy. The conquest of the Latins was the first step towards

imperialism. The oriental idea that the conquerors had a perpetual right to a parasitical life at the expense of the subject people was utterly rejected in favor of a far-seeing liberality by which the disabilities usually entailed by conquest were removed as quickly as possible, and the ultimate bestowal of full citizenship tended to bind the conquerors and the conquered with mutual interests in a united nation.

The Samnite wars brought the Sabellic tribes of Central Italy under the Roman colony system. This addition of territory was strategically necessary to prevent North and South Italy uniting to crush the new imperial power. Samnium was left with territory undiminished but her offensive power was broken by the skilful planting of Roman colonies around her borders.

The next step in imperialism was under the influence of the democratic assemblies. The Senate hesitated to make an alliance with Thurii which it knew would involve Rome in war with Tarentum and would virtually constitute a violation of the *ius fetiale*. The question, however, was taken by the tribune to the plebeian assembly, which now had full legislative powers, and the alliance was enthusiastically voted. The consequences were disastrous, for this action brought on the long and costly wars with Pyrrhus. For some time thereafter the people was content to leave its foreign policy in the hands of the experienced diplomats in the Senate. The First Punic War, however, was brought about by exactly similar circumstances, though we detect the jingoistic element in the deliberations of this young nation only too conscious of the fact that it had thrown back the arms of the greatest general of the time. The reviewer is unable to see why Mr. Frank differentiates this alliance from that with Thurii. Both alliances were made with the certainty that war would follow, and yet the one meant a violation of the *ius fetiale* while the other did not. However expedient it might be for Rome to control the Straits of Messina by concluding this treaty, expediency could hardly be recognized as obviating the obligations of the fetial institution. The occupation of Sardinia after the war shows that any religious scruples which the *ius fetiale* might have caused were by this time easily smoothed over by the plea of military necessity. Whatever the motives which brought Rome into the war, she emerged no longer the leader of a federation but an imperial democracy, for in organizing the new province she adopted the oriental principle that the conquered people were the tenants of the state which owned the soil. Moreover the democratic government in advocating the distribution of lands to the poor at Rome introduced an expensive paternalistic principle which led to far-reaching results in imperialism. The State surrendered its revenue-producing lands within Italy, and in order to recoup itself must extend its tributary domain beyond the bounds of the peninsula.

The analysis of the motives animating the two parties to the Second Punic War is particularly good. Hannibal had no intent to destroy Rome, as is shown by his treaty with Philip of Macedon, nor could he have expected to gain tributary empire in Italy, for the allies of Rome would not leave the federation except upon better terms than they were already enjoying. He could only promise autonomy under Carthage which would have meant nothing more to Carthage than her treaty rights already gave her. Hannibal could have intended nothing else than the humbling of Rome without thought of extermination or conquest. Rome's interests in Spain were solely in defense of the rights of her ally and friend—Massilia. At the close of the war she held Spain, rather to prevent Carthage from using it as a base, than because it was a desirable province. It was far from being so and it was very costly in lives and money. Spain, indeed, is a unique example of the apparent superiority of Punic over Roman imperialism.

Rome's intrusion into the affairs of the East was inspired by sentimental politics in the senatorial group, though I doubt whether the Romans would have been so sentimental, if they had not had a score against Philip of Macedon to even up. The policy of the Scipionic circle, however, was fundamentally anti-imperialistic and precluded forever any idea of expansion beyond the Adriatic. This idealism was opposed by Cato, who brought a reaction to 'practical politics' which, while anti-imperialistic as regards the East, demanded a ready obedience to the wishes of the Senate and put an end to the bickerings and intrigues of the petty Greek States.

In the half-century following the Second Macedonian war internal politics precluded any settled foreign policy. The establishment of a province in Macedonia after the defeat of the pretender seems to have sprung from nothing else than a desire for possession. The treatment of Greece proper, even after Mummius had destroyed Corinth, was quite different. Apparently the imposition of tribute on Greece was repugnant even to the practical politicians, and they were too practical to govern this poverty stricken land *gratis*. Rome's dealings with Carthage, if not violating the *ius fetiale* in encouraging Masinissa, were characterized by a "slimness" and injustice even greater than that meted out to the Spanish tribes. The conviction of supreme power marked a sharp decline in the moral tone of Roman diplomacy.

The bequest of Attalus gave Rome a foothold in Asia and the Gracchan legislation paved the way for further expansion in that it directly attached the business interests to this policy. The addition of new rich provinces in the East gave them greater territory for exploitation. Commercialism, which is so dominant a factor in modern imperialism, found no place in Roman diplomacy until the age of the Gracchi.

The Senate desired to govern with as little expenditure of blood and money as possible. Triumph-

hunting or the possibility of a commander becoming too prominent by success in war was not encouraged by the Senate. The disposition of Numidia after the war with Jugurtha shows its indifference to expansion. A clearer case is found in its attitude to Mithradates, whose aggressive tactics merely brought diplomatic protests for a long time. After Sulla was finally sent against him and defeated the Pontic forces, no territory was taken from the king save the province which he had wrested from Rome. Nor did Lucullus, in the second campaign against Mithradates, extend the Empire, though it is apparent that he intended to add Mithradates's kingdom to the newly inherited Bithynia and create one province. Yet Syria was given back to Antiochus. Lucullus brought on his head the wrath of the equites or commercial party in Rome by his cancellation of two-thirds of the public debts and his regulation of interest charges, and by reforming other abuses of the tax-collectors. So great an outcry was raised that he was recalled and the capitalists secured the appointment of Pompey in the hope of speedily ending the war and giving the shareholders of the tithe-farming syndicates a chance to recoup their losses. The chameleon Pompey—now the agent of the equestrian order—became an expansionist and his campaigns brought new provinces and six-fold tribute. While never violating the fetial law by taking the aggressive, his interpretation of the rules was most liberal and the theory that conquest gave possession was rigidly upheld.

Caesar was the first candid imperialist of Rome and his Gallic campaign is the clearest instance of purely aggressive expansion in the history of the Republic. His attitude towards the conquered people was that of the early Roman statesman. They were not revenue-producing subjects but possible candidates for full Roman citizenship. It is clear, however, that he regarded Gaul as a stepping stone to imperial power—a good field for military training and a splendid recruiting ground for his legions.

This summary of Mr. Frank's book can give but an approximation of its merits. It needs to be read *in toto* to be appreciated. Very occasionally we feel that the writer turns a blind eye or mayhap winks at Roman aggression, yet his keen analyses of the politics which led to the various steps in expansion are more often convincing than not. The book fills a gap in the field of Roman History and fills it exceedingly well.

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CAESAR IN THE SECOND YEAR

The objection to the use of Caesar in the second year seems to rest very largely upon the assumption that Caesar can be handled there only in the familiar traditional fashion. This, of course, is far from being true. Already schools here and there are adopting the very sensible plan of devoting a year and a half

to 'beginning Latin', a large part of the added time being given to the reading of a graded text.

Under this régime the student does not undertake Caesar until he has developed some real power to read the language. Actual experiment is showing that students thus trained can cover three or four books of Caesar in a single half-year, and with a real appreciation of what they are reading.

If, in addition to this, the teacher is wise enough to discard the fetish of Gallic War I–IV and to select the material from the whole range of Caesar, most of the objections to the use of that author in the second year will be fully met.

For it surely is a mistake, too, to suppose that only a teacher who is a genius can handle Caesar successfully in the second year, and that a very expensive apparatus is essential to good work. The most valuable help for the teacher of Caesar is a first-hand knowledge of the writings of Caesar and his continuators. This help any teacher can have who is willing to set aside the time for it. It is much to be feared that many people are trying to teach Caesar who have hardly glanced at the Civil War, to say nothing of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* or the *Bellum Africum*.

It would be an excellent thing if, in every University and College where teachers of Latin are trained, there should be offered a course in Caesar and his continuators in which the student should be required to become really acquainted with the text in the large. The story that Caesar and his staff officers tell is one of compelling interest and replete with striking incidents—an electric storm, the devices by which the enemy polluted the Nile-fed cisterns at Alexandria, the assassination of Pompey, the commander-in-chief forced to swim for his life, elephants in training for battle, and many other things. Personal experience with such a class shows how much such work is needed and what a change it produces in the attitude of mind of the prospective teacher.

If the High School teacher really knows his subject and has himself caught something of the inspiration of the theme, it will not require any artificial stimulus to make Caesar live, especially if, as suggested above, his class has been fully prepared before undertaking to read Caesar.

As a matter of fact we have not yet really given Caesar a fair trial under present-day conditions. If, after giving him a fair trial, we are unable to maintain his claim to at least a part of the second year, it will be time enough then to face the discouraging problem of finding a substitute.

To the scholar who knows the language well it may seem an easy task to pick out material suitable for second year reading; but the fact has proved to be just the reverse. The so-called easy Latin which we hear so much about usually proves more difficult for the student than does Caesar himself; and, if the Latin is really easy, there is apt to be something wrong with the subject-matter. After an excursion we usually